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Evaluation or assessment of scientific work in universities and other research organizations has 
traditionally been based on a procedure or a system of having equals from the same scientific field, 
peers, to value the quality of the output, the scientific paper. It is the peer review system with its 
almost jury–like functionality and a history of more than 200 years. The classic tradition looked at 
the output or the product of scientific work and ignored everything else and was for many years, 
and to some degree still is, acknowledged as a special procedure necessary to evaluate something as 
special or unique as scientific work. Such a system of organizing evaluation based on the economy 
of symbolic behavior constitutes a special marked for symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1981) .  
 
A central issue in science studies and science policy today is the changing role and function of 
science in society. How do we understand these changes and not the least what are the 
consequences for our traditional understanding of science and its systems? One illustration of this 
change towards a growing social and political influence on science and research is the very diverse 
landscape of research evaluation, one can see today. The landscape of research evaluation can be 
understood as the outcome of attempts to open the traditionally very closed and conservative system 
of scientific quality control. But has it influenced the internal or micro-level quality control in the 
scientific knowledge production? Discussions of problems in the organization, construction and 
function of the classic peer review system have been going on for a number of years and the 
criticism has sometimes been harsh. Nevertheless, the peer review system is still integrated in and 
commonly accepted by the scientific communities, the university system as well as in the political 
and public field. How does various public or private research organizations evaluate science quality 
when the role of science in society is changing rapidly, as well as the social and economic 
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conditions for the researcher? What is new, creative or innovative knowledge? What type of 
authorized procedures recognizes and acknowledges it? How to govern the production and 
evaluation of scientific knowledge? The article will argue that a critical rethinking of concepts and 
ideas from newer sociological and organizational theory in relation to knowledge production is the 
most promising strategy in order to overcome the limitations in the ongoing discussion in the 
sociology of science as well as in science on how to evaluate and select the best quality of research, 
e.g. the high quality knowledge products? 
 
Science in risk society 
Anybody who follows the headlines in the daily news has experienced the contradictions in the 
recent picture of scientific results in the media. The seemingly endless debates on the uses of gene 
technology in food production (GMO) illustrate this complicated situation in relation to the use of 
expert knowledge and scientific results in the public and political world today. Both the pro and the 
con positions regarding GMO’s present scientifically based arguments to support their position, 
arguments based on scientific results controlled by the traditional system, by peer reviews. In a 
situation, where rapid social, economically and ecological changes demand increasingly new 
trustworthy knowledge in order to be involved in solving problems (Beck 2000), the questions of 
both what is new scientific knowledge and how its trustworthiness is established demand more than 
ever a very critical look at the traditional system for quality control in science, the peer review 
system. 
On a more general level the problem has been raised. The traditional peer review based evaluation 
system belongs to the ‘legend of science’ to use Ziman’s (2000) expression, or can be paralleled to 
problems of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ in the regulation of market economy (Fuller 2000, 
p.90). A growing number of case studies in various science fields have shown the growth of more 
fundamental changes in the traditional organization of the production of scientific knowledge. In the 
field of science policy, Gibbons et. al (1994) launched the concepts of mode 1 and mode 2 science, 
based on the development of the application of scientific knowledge and a close relation between 
production and the application of knowledge. The concepts of mode 1 and 2 science have been 
criticized for being based on too narrow and limited empirical evidence leading to a conceptual 
differentiation claiming transdisciplinary organization and close application as something 
completely novel in the history of science (Audétat 2001, Fuller 1995, 2001, Weingart 2000, Godin 
1998). Even if the critics pointed at exaggeration and over-interpretation of various phenomena as 
part of the argumentation, the result was a much needed and necessary debate of the consequences 
of major changes in modern science and knowledge production. The arguments from The New 
Production of Knowledge have been developed further by Nowotny et. al. (2001) incorporating 
some of the major criticism. Through the introduction of perspectives from modern social theory on 
the contradictory function of risk, knowledge and expertise in modern societies2, the concept of 
social robust knowledge is introduced in order to strengthen the social explanation of the changed 
relations between science and society and as a proposal on how to solve the problem of selecting 
the right knowledge, i.e. how to assess quality under these new and very changed conditions. The 
concept of the Triple Helix (Etzkowitz, H. & Leydesdorff, L. 2000) relates to the rather new and 
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2 Theoretical arguments on knowledge, risk and expertise are taken from Beck 1992 [1986], 1999, Giddens 1990 and 
Beck, Lash and Giddens (1994). 
dramatic changes in the relation between science, policy and society but it focuses much more on 
the growing co-operation between university-based knowledge production, government science 
policy and industrial application.  
 
In the social sciences, the new focus on knowledge and especially the changed role of knowledge in 
the economy and social welfare is discussed as part of a more general discussion of the 
development of modern societies. Prominent social scientists like Giddens (1990, 1994), Beck 
(1992, 1994, 1999) (risk society), Habermas (1972, 1982) (dialogue and communication), Castells 
(1998, 2000) (information society) have showed how the development in late modernity in the 
Western World with major social changes has important implications for our understanding of the 
role of science and knowledge. The most central point is that the former unquestioned trust in 
scientific knowledge and expert advisory in the general public, the media and the political scene is 
changing. The public and political uses of scientific information and expert knowledge are today 
more and more experienced as partisan arguments or as only limited parts of the whole picture. The 
results are an erosion of the traditional trust in the neutrality and unquestionable truths of scientific 
knowledge (Giddens 1990, Beck 1992, 1999, Nowotny 2001) and hence a public and political focus 
on thrust and trust-creating procedures in relation to new knowledge. Indicators of the many 
changes in science and the relation to politics and the problem of creation of trust are the almost 
numerous new evaluation techniques in the field of science and research3. 
 
The implications of what traditionally has been regarded the central system for evaluation of 
research, the peer review system, are numerous, but in this article I will discuss two central 
problems. One problem is that the growth and constant changes in the former much more stable 
system of scientific disciplines implies a growing competition between knowledge paradigms in all 
science areas. It is no longer a situation of a dominating paradigm and a new upcoming one in the 
sense Kuhn (1970) argued, making it difficult to establish trust in a single peer review system. 
Today various paradigms exist side by side in almost any science field, the result being a growing 
number of local paradigms or ‘communities of practice’ based on time-limited boundary drawings 
(Gieryn 1994) between one specialty and another. Also the growing number of new scientific fields 
and transdisciplinary work or Mode 2 science with a different and more direct relation to 
application (Gibbons 1994, Nowotny 2001) is difficult to evaluate in the traditional systems based 
on a traditional Mode 1 disciplinary understanding of science. Related to this is the fact that new 
knowledge production more and more is a result of teamwork or group work where the contribution 
of the individual researcher is difficult to identify and measure. Furthermore, the accelerating speed 
                                                          
3 Ranging from the level of individual to institutions, peer reviews appear in various variations: Peer Review of Articles, 
Projects; Peer Advisory Board; Informed Peer Review; Rating/Expert-Statements; Visions, Forecasting. Research 
evaluation by professional evaluators encompass the individual, the institutional and the disciplinary level techniques 
and procedures; Research productivity, Personal Management; Benchmarking; Bibliometric measurement; Contract 
Steering; Advisory Boards; Cost-benefit Studies; Policy Formulation, Foresights. On the level of political participation 
and lay participation/NGO another group of research evaluation techniques is relevant: User Studies, Evaluation of 
application of knowledge, projects and of candidates; Public Hearings; Consensus Conferences. 
This is only a partial picture but it does show how differentiated the field of research evaluation has become in just a 
decade. (Hansson & Holst Jørgensen  2002, p. 72).  
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in the knowledge producing system conflicts with the rather slow and traditional system of peer 
reviews based on what has been produced and published.  
 
The other problem has to do with the fact that scientific work now has to be understood as wage 
work organized in large research organizations or universities, leaving the picture of the lonely 
truth-seeking scientist as obsolete as the picture of the medieval alchemist. Scientific work as wage 
work in often very large institutional or organizational arrangements implies questions of 
employment, career, salary etc. for the individual scientist as well as questions about working 
conditions the research organization. Weber was early in his analysis of this problem in his famous 
lecture on ‘Science as a Vocation’ (1919), but for many years this dimension was more or less 
ignored. With headings like ‘commodification of science’, the discussion of the implementations of 
the modern market economy influencing the production of scientific knowledge has been a growing 
part of the science policy discussion the last ten years (Gibbons and Wittrock 1985).   
The two problems in question in relation to production of scientific knowledge are the opening of 
the disciplinary borders (trans- or interdisciplinarity) and the growing influence from market 
economy. The radical and irreversible changes in scientific work and its organization created by this 
development will be the background for the discussion in the rest of this article. How can 
trustworthy evaluation systems be established or has the peer review systems potentials to survive 
these changes and  still be a central quality control system in science? 
 First, I will briefly comment on some of the central literature on the traditional quality evaluation 
system in science, the peer review system or the classic inside view on science, followed by some 
critical points made from a sociological view and from the new public management approach to 
evaluations in organizations, the policy view on science. After this literature-based discussion, I 
will discuss how useful concepts from social and organizational theory on organizing knowledge 
production are in relation to the question of how to evaluate research. 
 
The classic view: the ‘product before person’ approach to evaluation of scientific quality. 
The classic picture of a community of science as a specific set of social norms that guaranteed the 
quality of the products continued for a number of years almost unquestioned in the sociology of 
science. It was Robert Merton (1968) who first opened the field of science studies to sociology with 
a coherent analysis of the social basis for this system in the form of a number of central social 
norms in the community of science (CUDOS). Merton analyzed the norms from a rather functional 
understanding of science in society and the few critical questions raised at the time were concerned 
with the specific substance of the norms or the existence of other norm systems (Mitroff 1973, 
Ziman 1994). The system of  norms worked behind the back of the single scientist and for Merton 
they formed the functional background of the existence and further development of the dominant 
evaluation system, the peer review system (1973, 1968). The ‘community of science’ had according 
to Merton found its institutionalized form in the late 17th century in the peer review system. This 
system developed and institutionalized itself as science grew over the next centuries to become a 
major social and economic factor. But to the sociologist Merton, the questions of autonomy and 
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clear borderlines to the rest of society was essential in order to understand the uniqueness of 
scientific knowledge and to protect it from recent attempts to influence science.4 The closed quality 
evaluation system based on peers played a central role for the community of science in order to 
establish and reproduce its authority with regard to knowledge creation and cumulating in the 
society. “It is in this sense that the structure of authority in science, in which the referee system 
occupies a central place, provides an institutional basis for the comparative reliability and 
cumulating of knowledge.” (Merton and Zuckermann in Merton 1973, p. 495) But when public and 
political trust in science or maybe better, in the specific scientific knowledge, is eroding or 
changing as seems to be the case today, the system behind the production of certified, trustworthy 
scientific knowledge has to be scrutinized. Mertons analysis of the universal norms guiding 
scientists behavior with regard of production of recognized knowledge was an attempt to find ways 
to overcome threats to the autonomy of science 50-60 years ago (Merton 1968, p. 603). But this 
strategy to save the autonomy is clearly no longer tenable in a society, where the autonomy is 
questioned politically in public as well as economically through a growing commercial use. These 
changes must have substantial influence on the role of the quality control system based on a very 
idealized picture of the production of scientific knowledge. In the heritage of Merton, a number of 
attempts to strengthen the norm system has been tried out (Hagstrom 1965, Barber 1970, Ernø-
Kjølhede 2001) in order to save the autonomy. The foundation put forward by Merton to separate 
science and the scientist from the rest of society has had the maybe unforeseen consequence that it 
produced a fixation of the ideal picture of the isolation of science from society. The scientific 
product could be regarded completely isolated from all personal, social, political and economic 
influence, and the price for autonomy was a totally unrealistic picture of complete isolation.   
 
The sociological view: 
With a formulation from Boath and Bodnarczyk (1995, p.340), it looks as if the “knowledge or 
“facts” contained in scientific works and publications rise above the organizational and human 
factors of laboratory life, once the experiment is completed.” A large number of empirical studies of 
the social life in laboratories starting in the early 1980ties have very convincingly shown that it is 
not the case (Latour and Woolgar 1986, Latour 1987, Knorr-Cetina 1981). What scientists did in 
laboratories could not be explained with the help of the CUDOS norms, not even as a deviance from 
these norms, but only through the introduction of social and organizational factors. Social 
constructivist studies of the sociology of science showed in the 1970ties and 1980ties another reality 
addressing the influence of the social structure surrounding science like personal and organizational 
dimensions. “The needed only a few years to destroy effectively all the myths about the special 
character of scientific knowledge which the Mertonian/Popperian alliance had handled down.” 
(Mayntz and Schimank 1998, p.749)  The whole idea of a universal set of norms that governs the 
behavior of scientists based on a common understanding and acceptance of the social structure in 
                                                          
4 To Merton, it was important to fight against any attempts to change the full autonomy of science, see f. i. his closing 
remarks in the article Science and the Social Order: “The main conclusions of this paper may be briefly summarized. 
There exist a latent and active hostility toward science in many societies,… This paper does not present a program for 
action in order to withstand threats to the development and autonomy of science. It may be suggested however, that as 
long as the locus of social power resides in any one institution other than science and as long as scientists themselves 
are uncertain of their prime loyalty, their position becomes tenuous and uncertain.” (Merton 1968, p. 603 [1937]) 
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science and its hierarchies independent of the surrounding society is increasingly difficult to defend 
today. 
Starting from organizational sociology, Whitley (1984/2000) studied the internal organizational 
system in various science areas and found that modern science indeed is very differentiated when it 
comes to the organizational structure and reward systems of the various scientific disciplines. ”The 
explanation of such differences and their continued reproduction is linked to variations in reward 
systems and in the structure of legitimate audiences for intellectual contributions, as well as in the 
conditions governing access to research funds and other key resources” (Whitley 2000, p. 2.) Others 
have criticized the idea of a reward system of science operating in an ideal world managed by 
scientists with no other personal interest than the search for ‘truth’ or that the removal of the role of 
social, personal, organizational and political factors in science as in Merton’s norms in a modern 
society with huge investments in science and research rather strange (Fuller 2000, 2001). The 
opening of the field of scientific work to sociological analysis implies that  a number of new 
problems emerges, one is that the core of the research quality system, the peer review, has to be 
discussed as a social system organized in order to select the quality in knowledge. Recent discussion 
has put focus on the operation of this quality system. Gieryn (1983) conceptualized boundary - work 
in order to illustrate how social processes always have been involved in the struggle between what is 
and what is not accepted or defined as scientific knowledge. Ziman argues in his recent book (2000) 
for the importance of the inclusion of the societal surroundings of science and for a social science 
approach in order to understand the development of science in society, but is not very explicit about 
the implications of a social science approach to the analysis of science.  
The strengths of the peer review in evaluating research have always been its ability to deliver a 
quality brand or stamp on a piece of research, especially when published in a top journal. The 
problems are besides the influence of social and organizational factors that the demands for a 
‘perfect’ peer review are very costly and time-consuming to meet. It is a system open to social and 
political pressure or influence, its reliability is by the nature of the knowledge-creation processes 
uncertain and difficult to estimate5. New knowledge is difficult to evaluate in a world of competing 
knowledge paradigms. But even if the recent development in the sociology of science has 
deconstructed the classic Mertonian understanding of research evaluation based on peer reviews, the 
problem still is to come up with new models or ideas of how to evaluate research and knowledge.  
 
The policy view: the productivity-focus of the new public management evaluation of research 
The first major challenge to the former so powerful self-governing system of science came as a part 
of the general reforms of the public sector starting in the early 1980es often under the label New 
Public Management. For public funded research organizations, it meant a new and powerful focus 
on modernization through concepts like ‘value for money’ or auditing of the public sponsored 
research. The development and organization of policy-based evaluation of research was quite 
different in the various countries, but even if the peer review system looked like it might have 
                                                          
5 A number of studies have shown the many problems often associated with peer reviews, the old boys network, 
nepotism, the Matthew effect, lack of independent reviewers etc.. Cicchetti (1991) and Kostoff (1995/99) have 
summarized in detail most of the central discussion of peer reviews (for an overview see Hansson 2001).   
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survived or maybe even dominates the new evaluation systems, important changes have taken 
place. The public policy discussion on evaluation of science, science policy and scientific quality 
broke up the former internal and often very closed scientific community discussions. Suddenly, the 
peer review system was placed in a broad and open policy-influenced organizational context with a 
number of important consequences for the traditional autonomy view on science and research. 
Based on a large case study and the experience from evaluation systems in Danish universities Foss 
Hansen and Borum (1999, 2000) concluded about the new role or function of the peer review 
system: “In the field of research, existing standards are applied to new evaluation tasks. The 
standard, peer review, is a standard for organizing, and not for defining criteria. This makes it 
flexible in relation to possibilities for professional variations, maintains focus on the evaluation of 
professional quality, and sustains the power balance....”(1999, p. 324).  
Peer review is then defined as a an open standard of how to organize the evaluation of quality, not 
in order to isolate the question of quality from various types of external influence, but on the 
contrary to set a standard for how to organize the various external relations in evaluations. Based on 
the experience from a case study of research evaluation on Copenhagen Business School, Foss 
Hansen and Borum (2000, p. 296) conclude: “The crucial consideration in relation to further 
development of standards for research evaluation seems to be the balance between exploration and 
exploitation. Routinization of research evaluation through strict standards reduces costs and 
facilitates comparisons and standard operating procedures. But routinization also drives out 
experimentation and risks transforming evaluations into reporting routines. These may provide 
useful data at reasonable cost, and attention-creating indicators. But they will provide input of only 
limited value to the actors’ sense-making processes about research, research milieux, management 
systems and culture.”  
The are a number of very complex problems related to the development of such an open 
standardized evaluation system. How is this open standard used, how is it legitimized as a quality 
system, what are the relations to the classic peer review system?  
The necessity of a more solid foundation to establish this open standard is based on the fact that it 
can be very difficult to secure the necessary openness in such a standard. “A fetish for quan-
tification seems to be astir among our contemporaries. We worship the altar of statistics: the 
penchant for quantities is a salient characteristic of contemporary Western culture. Everything we 
touch turns into numbers" (Rescher 1995: 82)6. The quest for quantification and measurement is 
very real in the framework of new public management evaluation (Pollit 1996). New standards for 
evaluation of research can easily become the victim of the ‘fetish for quantification’ based on a 
combination of pressure for cost-reduction and routine as the natural result of a bureaucratically 
organized activity. The result will then be the introduction of a number of quantitative evaluation 
techniques, (from benchmarking to bibliometrics) in order to reduce the costs and establish 
administrative visibility, defining the criteria for evaluation and closing the attempts to open and 
contextualize the evaluation standard. Brunsson (2000) has shown that the implementation of a set 
of standardized procedures for professional organizations often results in unwanted and destructive 
consequences in relation to the professional norms and values in the organization. The attempts to 
de-couple the audit process in the organization into separate units or sub-parts of the universities 
                                                          
6 "In our own time, measurement means nothing if not precision and objectivity. Our ideal exchange is an impersonal 
one. Consumers rarely lay eyes on the owner or maker of the items they purchase;...”.  Porter (1995: 23)  
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has according to Power rarely been successful, as the “external audit process rarely (is) sealed off 
from the rest of the audit organization, despite strategies with that intention” (Power 1997).  A 
central goal of a very formalized auditing or evaluation of research is, like other NPM programs, an 
attempt to colonize the organization, to “challenge the organizational power and discretion of 
relatively autonomous groups, such as doctors and teachers, by making these groups more publicly 
accountable for their performance.” (ibid. p. 97) 
The first years of the UK system for evaluation of university-based research can illustrate how a 
formalized standardization often takes over the research evaluation processes and hinders the 
necessary development of new experience with evaluation. The ‘side-effects’ of the closed standard 
system were an undermining of the original accountability by certain types of behavior by reporting 
the results in a way that it “much more resembles the reports by a civil service in a defeated country 
to an occupying power, or by state-owned industrial plants or farms to central government in a 
command economy.”(Trow 1996, p.314)  
The problem of closing the standard for evaluation is always present. Even if the agenda of 
evaluation of research is organizational change and development and not just ‘value for money’ in 
research, the modified peer review, as an open standard, is still a new and unproven evaluation 
instrument. In the end it very easy, even for concepts or models for evaluation of research aiming at 
organizational development and the broader social setting around production of knowledge, to end 
up oriented towards the scientific product. The orientation towards organizational problems in 
research evaluation has become more commonly accepted in the last years, but has not yet resulted 
in new theoretical or empirical models for evaluation of research that include the social and 
organizational dimensions. The growing awareness of the importance of social and organizational 
dimensions in the evaluation of research cannot change the fact that the classic peer review model 
seems to be a very stable system and the only one widely accepted for assessment of science 
quality. A number of modifications of the ‘peers’ can be found, like the extension of the concept of 
peers to include general experts, managers and science policy officers. 
These questions will be discussed in the following chapter on the background of a short excursion 
into recent discussions in social and organizational theory on how to understand the conditions of 
knowledge production. The idea is to try to establish a more coherent conceptually and theoretically 
foundation of the organization and operation of evaluation systems in relation to its prime function 
to select and brand trustworthy quality in scientific knowledge.  
 
 
The problem of the social dimension in scientific and knowledge work 
The problems and limits of the peer review system have often been discussed in the literature on 
research evaluation over the years. But the major part of the discussion has been based on reviews 
of empirical studies of the functionality of peer reviews, concluding that the system has certain 
weaknesses but can be made to function better and fulfill the demands through revisions of 
procedures and evaluation techniques (Cicchetti, 1991). A few studies (Kostoff 1995/99, Hemlin 
1996) has gone further and introduced the organizational surroundings of the peer review system.  
According to Bozeman et. al. (2001), the suggested alternative to the peer review in research 
evaluation is very often the introduction of evaluation approaches from other fields based on 
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microeconomic theory; cost-benefit studies or benchmarking and other ‘hard’ or quantified 
evaluation procedures.7 But the problem of how to evaluate scientific knowledge or just new 
knowledge is not restricted to the field of research evaluation. In relation to knowledge in 
organizations, the economic approach has not been convincing in relation to problems of 
knowledge selection in the new economy. Mainstream economics and business economics are not 
really equipped whether conceptually or theoretically to face the challenges of the knowledge 
economy. The knowledge economy has made the importance of knowledge for the continuation of 
economic welfare in the free market economy extremely empirically visible. This challenge to 
economics was raised by Hayek (1945) 8 and later by North (1994). The result in business 
economics was a slow shift in paradigms towards a growing interest in knowledge creation and its 
organization and application on the level of the firm. But neither transaction cost theory or 
institutional theory has yet been able fully to integrate the social dimensions in relation to 
production and assessment of knowledge and especially the complexity of knowledge production in 
the firm. 
The problem can be restated as a part from a more general problem of embeddedness of the social 
dimensions in economic behavior originally formulated by Granovetter (1985) in his much cited 
article on the importance of acknowledging social relations like trust, confidence, distrust etc. in 
economic behavior. Granovetter’s argument was a convincing and very explicit critique of the 
omission or negligence of the importance of social or personal relations in economic behavior by 
economic theory from the neo-classic economics to Williamsson’s institutional theory. “The 
embeddedness argument stresses instead the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or 
“networks”) of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. The widespread 
preference for transacting with individuals of known reputation implies that few are actually content 
to rely on either generalized morality or institutional arrangements to guard against trouble.” 
(Granovetter 1985, p.490) The general criticism of the ignorance of social relations in economics is 
just as relevant in relation to the traditional understanding of system of science and research.  
The problem of the embedded but not recognized social relations in the systems of quality 
evaluation in science, the peer review system, is rooted in the functionalism of the Mertonian 
heritage with its attempts to formulate an objective social theory on the system and function of 
science. Even though Merton recognized the complex and fuzzy social world amongst scientists 
(the Matthew effect), he nevertheless disregarded its importance in his functionalist theory on the 
conditions for scientific knowledge production. 
 
                                                          
7 Breslau (1997) has in the field of labor market evaluation convincingly demonstrated how microeconomic evaluation 
methods are introduced in order to establish political credibility. 
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8 In his article from 1945, Hayek puts forward some very important critical points toward mainstream economic theory 
for its ignorance of the role of knowledge for the production of welfare. In the article Hayek completely disregard that it 
was in fact Marx who much earlier, in his theory of labor value, formulated the overall importance of the active human 
knowledge and competence in the value creating processes through his extensive critique of Ricardo’s concept of value. 
For Marx, the use (use value) of the living labor in the production was the central ‘secret’ of the capitalist production of 
surplus value and hence of economic growth.  
New concepts or models for evaluation of research – contributions from organizational 
theory: 
The question put forward earlier in the discussion of the organization of research evaluation and the 
peer review tradition was how to argue for a solid foundation for the open standard peer review 
evaluation. The standard should ideally make it possible to maintain and develop research 
evaluations in an open and broad framework focusing on development and change and not on 
control. It should include the traditional use of peer reviews of articles and proposals, an activity 
still very important in the production of scientific knowledge not only as a control but just as 
important as part of the critical discourse which produces solid new knowledge. And it should 
reflect the problem of the embeddedness of social relations, the personal relations, networks, and 
organization, in other words the social settings around the knowledge producing researcher in the 
evaluation. 
On of the most obvious starting points is the discussion of social capital. The concept was originally 
a part of Bourdieus concepts to analyze power and dominance in different institutions but it was 
more or less appropriated into modern social science by Coleman (1990) in order to analyze 
common values and norms in a group or organization.9 A central idea was to formulate a critical 
distance to the limits in the concept of human capital used by economists like Gary Becker, where 
the embeddedness problem was largely ignored.  
In organizational theory, the concept has had a revival. In order to understand the social and 
organizational dimensions in relation to development of new knowledge in the firm, Nahapiel and 
Ghoshal (1998) argue for the use of the concept of social capital as a means to focus on the function 
of relations and especially network relations in the production of knowledge. Therefore, social 
capital is central for the understanding of the production of knowledge (intellectual capital) and 
market advantages of the firm. It is10 “the sum of actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available trough, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social 
unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be mobilized trough 
that network” (ibid. 243). Social capital resources can be described by three dimensions, the 
structural, the relational and the cognitive dimensions and are in various ways embedded in the 
social and personal arrangements and interactions of persons in a social structure, a firm or an 
                                                          
9 In the chapter on Social Capital in the new twentysix-volume large International encyclopedia of the social & 
behavioral sciences , the author R. W.  Jackman credits Coleman for the recent popularity of the concept. In this new 
and large international work of reference, it is astonishing that there is not a single reference to the works of Pierre 
Bourdieu and his concepts of social and symbolic capital. Ben Fine (2001, p. 191) writes that “although Bourdieu is a 
(decreasingly) acknowledged initiator of the theory of social capital, the critical aspects of his contributions have been 
excised in deference to the tamer versions associated with the likes of Coleman and Putnam. In particular, Bourdieu has 
been emphasised with the social construction of the content of  social capital….that it is irreducibly attached to class 
stratification which, in turn, is associated with the exercise of economic and other forms of exploitation, and the relation 
between them. Significantly, the functional approaches to social capital attached to the founding empirical studies of 
Coleman and Putnam have both been shown to be questionable..”.   
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10 Nahapiel and Ghoshal use the concept of social capital with references to both Coleman and Bourdieu. “In particular, 
for Bourdieu, systematic analysis of the volume and structure of social capital enables examination of the relationships 
between social and other forms of capital.” (ibid p. 262) But as it will be shown later, their reading of Bourdieu is very 
traditional. 
organization. Intellectual capital can be characterized as tacit11 or explicit knowledge and social 
(organizational) or individual knowledge and “for a given firm, these four elements collectively 
constitute its intellectual capital”. (247)  Important dimensions of social capital for development of 
new intellectual capital are network ties, network configuration and appropriable organization. 
Following their idea of intellectual capital as a social artefact, e.g. it is always embedded in a social 
context, shared language and codes and shared narratives are constitutive to the creation of 
intellectual capital. Other important relational dimensions of social capital are trust, social norms 
(especially on openness and team-working), obligations and expectations. But the relation between 
social and intellectual capital is not one-sided.  
The production and sharing of knowledge in an organization help or strengthen the social capital 
giving the organization an advantage. Turning the problem Nonaka (1994) extended the concept by 
arguing at the perspective of the organization minimizes the whole range of problems and dynamics 
located in the relations between individual persons and between persons and the organizational 
structure. The basic ideas or the theoretical foundations of organizational creation of knowledge 
should then be based on “the active, subjective nature of knowledge represented by such terms as 
“belief” and “commitment” that are deeply rooted in the value system of individuals” (Nonaka 
1994, 16). Polanyi’s (1983) concepts of tacit and explicit knowledge are introduced to open the 
relation between the individual and the organizational knowledge creation. The organizational 
knowledge creation is from this perspective depending on the handling of individuals and 
management ought according to Nonaka to be very oriented towards self-organization like teams. 
The specific demands for knowledge and solutions to selected problems and the standards to be 
evaluated by are determined by the management, but Nonaka emphasizes that management in a 
knowledge creating organization has to be very flexible in order to combine the individual 
‘commitment’ with the organizational demands. Managing through “enabling conditions -creative 
chaos, redundancy of information and requisite variety” (ibid. p. 27) relies to a large degree on self-
organization (teams) and an open and flexible organization. The efficiency and stability of the 
traditional organizational and managerial hierarchy have a role in order to guide the knowledge 
creation process by setting up standards for evaluation and other types of goals and guidelines, but 
it has to be very open to bottom-up processes in order not to destroy the individual creativity and 
commitment which are so important to the knowledge creation.  
Both Nahapiel and Ghoshal and Nonaka have more or less discussed the problems from the point of 
view of the traditional organization. A classic problem in scientific knowledge creation is what 
Merton formulated as the norm of universalism or Gieryn as boundary-drawing, the necessary 
exchange of knowledge between unknown participants in the creation and correction of knowledge. 
                                                          
11 I think it could be useful to try to rethink the much-used conceptual subdivision of knowledge in tacit and explicit 
knowledge. Originally, Polanyi used tacit knowledge for types of knowledge, we cannot speak about or codify like “we 
know more than we can tell” or ”Tacit knowing is shown to account (1) for a valid knowledge of a problem, (2) for the 
scientist's capacity to pursue it, guided by his sense of approaching its solution, and (3) for a valid anticipation of the yet 
indeterminate implications of the discovery arrived at in the end.” Polanyi tried to argue for the role of some of the 
more unconscious dynamics in the creation of new knowledge. Explicit knowledge is everything else and this 
everything else is probably a very heterogeneous collection of types of knowledge. From the sociological analysis of 
group learning, the concepts of formal and informal knowledge might be a fruitful way to divide the concept of explicit 
knowledge in a way that relates to the social and organizational settings it is performed inside. One advantage of this 
distinction is that it allows us to look closer into some of the social processes of knowledge creation and the function of 
learning, formal as well as less formal.  
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Narrowing the focus to the organization is in this respect a serious problem. The concept of 
networks or what is the network and what is the organization or firm, where and what constitute the 
boundaries or borders between the organization or firm and the outside world, who are the 
gatekeepers etc. are problems only very briefly discussed by Nahapiel and Ghoshal and Nonaka. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) introduce the concept of absorptive capacity in order to understand 
how the internal organization of the firm has important influence on the knowledge production 
through its ability to exploit external knowledge. The central problem is then to establish a balance 
between existing specialization and the absorption of new knowledge in order to secure innovation. 
Kogut (2000) and Kogut and Zander (1992) address the problem directly by the help of the concept 
of boundary making between the firm and the environment. Kogut’s (2000) discussion of the 
dynamics of the boundaries between the firm and the networks when looking at information assets 
focuses on the interaction and dynamics of the relations. ”Networks are more than just relationships 
that govern the diffusion of innovations and norms, or explain the variability of access to 
information across competing firms. Because they are the outcome of generative rules of co-
ordination, networks constitute capabilities that augment the value of the firm.” (Kogut 2000, p. 
423)  Gant (1996) takes up another but related problem, the difficulties of knowledge integration in 
the organization. Knowledge integration puts focus on the organizational structure and it functions 
in relation to the integration and application of knowledge. The concept of ‘organizational 
capability’ is important as it focuses on organizational routines and procedures in the process of 
knowledge integration. “The task is to devise decision processes that permit integration of the 
specialized knowledge held throughout the organization – not just in the boardroom, but on the 
shop floor as well.” (Gant p. 384) These problems discussed by Gant point to discussions in the 
field of sociology of work on how to organize and motivate the workforce and are clearly related to 
the discussion of tacit and explicit knowledge and teams. This discussion of the organizational 
knowledge creation process shows that when it comes to real knowledge production much has to be 
left to the dynamics of the individual and the group in a loose or flat organizational structure. The 
team evolves as a central organizing principle in the knowledge creating organization.   
In order to understand, manage and evaluate knowledge creation in an organization as dynamic and 
complex, relational processes, focus on the product, knowledge in the form of a product, patent, 
article are important but clearly not sufficient. A number of contributions from organizational 
theory have taken up the challenge. Nahapiel and Ghoshal’s definition of social capital, the role of 
tacit and explicit knowledge in the knowledge creation process (Nonaka 1994, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995), network relations in- and outside the organization (Kogut), absorptive capacities 
for new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), boundaries and gate-keepers, organizational 
principles for project work, teams etc. (Gant 1996) - all argue for a much broader understanding of 
the role of the organization in the knowledge production. The direct focus on the organizational and 
social processes surrounding the knowledge creation has, of course, much to do with the market 
driven necessity to produce a competitive advantage for the firm, but it has its strengths in the close 
connection between the organization and knowledge creation. The market competition, on the other 
hand, calls for secrecy in order to protect profitability and therefore implies serious restrictions for 
the public peer review processes.  
 
A model for evaluation of social capital in organizations: 
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But one problem remains after this convincing break with the traditional approach to studies of 
science and knowledge; how to combine or integrate these contributions into something that can be 
empirical studied and evaluated. Bozeman, Dietz and Gaughan (2001) confront the problem of how 
to evaluate research realizing that the traditional evaluation methods are too narrow and restricted. 
Much in line with the above-mentioned attempts to analyze knowledge production in organizations, 
they discuss human capital theory, tacit knowledge and social networks in order to develop a model 
for a more organizational-based approach to the evaluation as an alternative to peer based methods. 
Combined with the idea of a “knowledge value collective (as) a set of individuals connected by 
their uses of a particular body of information” (ibid. p. 719, Rodgers and Bozeman, 2001), 
Bozeman, Dietz and Gaughan too end up with the concept of social capital from Bourdieu and 
Coleman and Coleman’s concept of human capital as the central core of a Science and Technology 
human capital model. “The evaluation of science requires an approach in touch with knowledge of 
the social context of scientific work. An S&T human capital model is first a model of scientific 
work and its social qualities (eg., Rodgers and Bozeman 2001); the evaluation methodology flows 
from this more fundamental conceptualization. Much of this capital, especially that aspect that is 
interpersonal and social, is embedded in social and professional networks, technological 
communities or knowledge or knowledge value collectives. …. none of these discounts the more 
traditional aspects of individual scientist’s talent, … Our concept simply recognizes that in modern 
science being brilliant is only necessary, not sufficient. “(Bozeman, Dietz and Gaughan 2001 p. 
724) Their model can be summarized into a model for research evaluation with four advantages 
(ibid. p.733) : 
“1. It deals with the life cycle dynamics and the evolution of scientific and technological fields,  
2. It conforms closely to scientists’ own conception of their work and exploits knowledge 
developed in the social study of science 
3. It can act as a counterweight against policy makers’ needs to ‘rush to judgment’ 
4. It can provide an alternative based on something other than the monetized value of science.”  
The dynamic, contextual and time sensitive approach to evaluation has to be reviewed with regard 
to the theoretical concepts used to argue for the model. Bozeman, Dietz and Gaughan use a rather 
free combination of the concepts of social and human capital from Coleman with his background in 
rational choice theory and a rather traditional conception of theory and social capital from 
Bourdieu, who despite his critical distance towards French Marxism uses the concept of capital 
much in line with Marx,  works with a concept of capital  that only exists and functions in relation 
to a field (Bourdieu 1987, 1998, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The concept of social capital 
presupposes the recognition of a special field or arena, a micro-cosmos, with autonomy and clearly 
differentiated from its surroundings. The attempts by Bozeman, Dietz and Gaughan (2001), Burt 
(1997) and by Nahapiel and Ghospal (1998) to use the concept of social capital in order to 
emphasize the dependency of the knowledge production on a broad range of personal qualifications 
as well as the organization leave out the discussion of the field or the specific context in which the 
social capital operates.  
 
A digression to Bourdieu and the field of science: 
In relation to studies of science or knowledge producing organizations, Bourdieu (1981) assigns the 
field a central role: “It is the scientific field which, as the locus of a political struggle for scientific 
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domination, assigns each researcher, as a function of his position within it, his indissociably 
political and scientific problems and his methods – scientific strategies which, being expressly or 
objectively defined by reference to the political and scientific positions constituting the scientific 
field, are at the same time political strategies.” (Bourdieu 1981, p. 33) Later, he refined his theory in 
a study of INRA (1998).12 In this study, he introduces the concept of scientific capital as a special 
form of social capital in this field and goes on to develop the relation between his key concepts. 
Following Bourdieu (1987, 1998), the social or symbolic capital cannot be discussed without a 
specification of the field, a dependency quite often is ignored, leading to a partial or misleading use 
of the concept of social capital in empirical studies13. In order to speak of social or symbolic capital, 
it is necessary to define a specific field, e.g. a field or an arena with a certain level of autonomy in 
relation to its surroundings. The field of science is characterized by its ability to design, mediate 
and reformulate external demands and forces. The field is composed of various representations in 
the form of constructions, norms and rules and in relation to the field of science. Bourdieu 
emphasizes that the degree of autonomy is varying (basic and applied research and natural and 
social science have very different degrees of autonomy and hence, constitutes different fields). To 
Bourdieu, the concept of scientific capital is as a special type of symbolic capital existing in a 
scientific field. “The amount of capital designates the weight or strength of actors in the field in 
relation to other actors. Scientific capital is a special type of symbolic capital based on credits or 
recognition in the field.” (Bourdieu 1998, p. 21) 
Bordieu operates with two types of scientific capital; one based on political or institutional power in 
relation to institutions and economic funding and one based on personal power from the recognition 
by the invisible college. Central for the constitution of the field is the power and struggle between 
actors and between actors in the field and with the surroundings (other fields). The concept of 
habitus refers to prescriptions and attitudes among the actors, very often in the form of scientific 
interests presented as altruistic or above everyday politics. From the standpoint of the field, it is 
constituted by various representations, e.g. various social constructions of reality by the actors in a 
never-ending internal struggle.  
What is the outcome of this short presentation of Bourdieu’s theory of scientific knowledge 
production? Most importantly, the discussion by Bourdieu has established a solid foundation for a 
critical review of studies based on the concept of social capital. Quite often the concept is used on 
empirical material without taking the problem of the field into account, e.g. the specific context 
(Fine 2001, p. 65-96). But it is possible to see an outline of another research strategy with much 
                                                          
12 INRA – Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, an agricultural research institution in France established in 
1946. 
13 To Marx, capital is the process of producing a surplus, a process forced to constant reproduction and extension and 
not a steady state. It would clarify the use and development of the concept of ‘social capital’ if it is substituted by 
‘social value’. Value indicates the quality and potentials in ‘something’, only realizable in the process as capital. The 
problem is much more than semantic, because value indicates something to be measured empirically while capital is 
value in the processing mode, creating surplus value. “Value therefore now becomes value in process, money in 
process, and, as such, capital. It comes out of circulation, enters into it again, preserves and multiplies itself within its 
circuit, comes back out of it with expanded bulk, and begins the same round ever afresh.  ….  “M-C-M' is therefore in 
reality the general formula of capital as it appears prima facie within the sphere of circulation.” Karl Marx, Capital 
Volume One ch. 4: The General Formula for Capital.   
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more far-reaching perspectives for research evaluation, through insisting on a social or sociological 
frame of reference for the understanding of how knowledge is produced and logically, what has to 
be the main focus on any evaluation of science and knowledge production in general. The short 
presentation of Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus strengthen the argument that the concept of the 
field or the arena is very central and unavoidable if the concept of social or symbolic (scientific) 
capital is used. The field has to be specified in order to differentiate between types of scientific 
capital, the concrete types of habitus (norms and attitudes) and most importantly, how the actors in 
the field constantly are parts of the process of its constitution (representation). The way the actors 
(scientists) perceive themselves, their attitudes towards the field in question is a dynamic part of 
what constitutes the field and therefore an integral and necessary part of any study of scientific 
knowledge production processes and evaluations thereof. Insisting on the combination of the 
concepts of capital and field makes it possible to integrate more technical studies of the output of 
scientific knowledge production in order to measure parts of the scientific capital in a field. First of 
all, it strengthens the argument for the open peer review standard as the organizational frame of 
reference for research evaluation. 
 
Conclusion: 
The interrelation between scientific knowledge and the social environment in both production and 
in use has been the subject for a number of studies in sociology of science recently. Reaching from 
how personal trust-relations have decisive importance in high-energy physics in the selection of 
experimental data (Knorr-Cetina 1999) to the growing importance of the social acceptance of 
scientific knowledge in society (Nowotny 2001), the problem of the social or the social dimensions 
in science and research has received growing attention. But neither the micro-studies of the 
interaction of single researchers nor the macro-studies of scientific knowledge in society have 
focused explicitly on the knowledge production processes in its organizational settings. Recent 
developments in organizational theory on knowledge in organizations have focused the discussion 
of the function of the social dimensions on the knowledge creation process placing the organization 
in a central role in the knowledge creation process. Concepts and ideas from the discussion of 
knowledge creation in organizations and networks have found their way into the discussion of 
scientific knowledge production (Bozeman, Dietz and Gaughan 2001). The dynamic concepts of 
social, symbolic and scientific capital have already influenced the discussion but as it have been 
shown a much more systematic use of Bourdieu’ s theory will take the discussion much farther and 
open for empirical studies of ‘the social’ in science. The interrelated concepts of capital and field 
open for bridging the gap between the studies of the organizational framework for knowledge 
production and the problems of the changing social frames for knowledge production as discussed 
by Nowotny (2001) and others14.   
The problem posed in the beginning of the article on restrictions and limits in the traditional 
approaches to evaluation of research can be reformulated in the light of a social and organizational 
understanding of knowledge production. The main critique raised was that the traditional evaluation 
system in research, the classic peer review, is insufficient as the only instrument to evaluate the 
                                                          
14 Nowotny (2001) uses the concept of Agora, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff  (2000) the concept of triple helix and Ziman 
(2000) post-academic knowledge in order to capture dimensions of the social influence on science. 
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quality of research in the process of knowledge production. The argument is supported by the 
empirical fact that in the last twenty years a very broad arena of evaluation and assessment systems 
for quality in research has come up, but most of them do not explicitly take up the organizational 
dimensions. The modified peer review as an open standard (Foss Hansen and Borum 1999, 2000) 
has been suggested as the framework for contextualize research evaluations. Through the discussion 
of contributions from social and organizational theory on knowledge production, the argument for 
an open standard for research evaluation has been strengthened. As the context for knowledge 
production becomes more and more important, the research evaluation methods have to be related 
very closely to the specific knowledge producing environment or context. The definition of a field 
and its scientific capital, the active participation of the actors in defining the field, the role of both 
traditional and new forms of knowledge in a field, all seem to point in one direction; it is necessary 
to develop research evaluation or assessment systems in context, e.g. with focus on the social and 
organizational processes surrounding the knowledge production.  
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